The special status of flashbulb memories was investigated by contrasting the effects of age on the phenomenology and consistency of flashbulb memories of September 11 over a 2-year delay period with those of a mundane staged control event, learning that one had not won a small prize. Flashbulb memories produced no significant age effects for either phenomenological characteristics or test-retest consistency, as predicted by Mather"s (2004) emotional compensation hypothesis. By contrast, the control event resulted in significant age effects for phenomenological characteristics (e.g., specificity and the amount of detail recalled), but not for test-retest consistency. Furthermore, in both age groups, memories of September 11 were significantly more vivid, detailed and consistent than control memories even though the test-retest interval was twice as long for flashbulb memories. In addition, correlations between consistency scores and ratings of rehearsal were positive for control memories, but negative for flashbulb memories. The theoretical implications of these findings for research on cognitive aging and flashbulb memories are discussed.
short delay intervals of 6 to 12 months. To assess whether flashbulb memories are similar to usual cases of source memory it may be necessary to examine age effects with longer delay intervals (cf. Tekcan & Peynircioglu, 2002) . To address these issues, the current study examined flashbulb memories of September 11 (possibly the most tragic event in flashbulb research so far), used a long delay of almost two years and thoroughly assessed the cognitive status of participants.
Comparing flashbulb and non-flashbulb control memories
In order to properly understand age effects on flashbulb memories, it is also crucial to have a truly comparable non-flashbulb control event (cf. Kensinger et al., 2006) . Although there are a growing number of studies that have used control events, none are totally satisfactory. Comparisons of reception context to memories of the actual event (e.g., factual details of the terrorist attack) are interesting but not entirely appropriate as they confound a type of memory (autobiographical vs. semantic) (Bohannon, 1988; Bohannon & Symons, 1992; Bohannon, et al., 2007; Er, 2003; Nachson & Zelig, 2003; Pezdek, 2003a; Shapiro, 2006; Smith, Bibi & Sheard, 2003; Tekcan, Ece, Gülgöz & Er, 2003; Wolters & Goudsmit, 2005) . 2 The most relevant studies have compared flashbulb memories to personal autobiographical memories (usually, a self-selected salient event from the week preceding the flashbulb event)
with mixed results. Some studies show superior consistency of flashbulb memories (Christianson, 1989; Curci & Luminet, 2006; Davidson et al., 2006; 
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Peynircioglu, 2002), while others report no reliable differences (Davidson & Glisky, 2002; Talarico & Rubin, 2003; ; see also Kensinger et al., 2006; Weaver, 1993) .
The control events used in these studies have been criticized (Brewer, 1992; Larsen, 1992) , and Wright and Gaskell (1995) have complained about the lack of clarity as to what can count as a good control event in these studies. Personal events chosen by participants are different for each participant, both in terms of the event contents and its emotional impact. Moreover, these self-selected memories are not about the context of hearing the personal news. They are the event itself. Hence, one of the major canonical categories of "source" (a defining feature of all flashbulb memory descriptions, see Neisser & Harsch, 1992 , Shapiro, 2006 is not applicable.
Consequently, Brewer (1992) suggested that a proper comparison should (a)
involve a control event that asks participants to recall their personal circumstances of hearing some mundane personal news, and (b) be the same for all participants. This will ensure that the two events are comparable in terms of canonical categories, including the source. The present study, to our knowledge, is the first to have used such a control event and compared it with a flashbulb event.
Strategy for this study
The present investigation comprises two studies with nearly identical designs.
The first used a dramatic flashbulb event -the terrorist attack in New York on . The second used a staged non-flashbulb control event from participants" own personal past. This event was same for all participants and involved receiving the news by mobile phone that the participant was not a winner in a prize draw run by the experimenter. Using mobile phones ensured that participants would be in a variety of locations, as with flashbulb memories.
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In both studies, young and old British participants were initially tested either 1-2 days after the target event (short delay) or 10-11 days after the event (long delay).
Half of all participants were first re-tested two weeks after their initial test. This allowed us to assess the amount of forgetting and age effects, if any, that may have occurred between this initial re-test (when memories were fresh) and subsequent re-test after a long delay. In Study 1 (flashbulb memory) all participants were finally re-tested after a delay of 23-24 months. In Study 2 (control memory) all participants were retested after a shorter delay of 11-12 months.
Memory was assessed by telephone interview (see Christiansen, 1989; Davidson & Glisky, 2002 , Davidson, et al., 2006 , for a similar procedure), using an instrument based on the Flashbulb Memory Questionnaire of M.A. Conway et al. (1994) . The interview protocol is shown in Table 1 . Participants" memories were tested via both free recall (memory description of personal circumstances) and probed recall (answers to canonical questions about time, location, activity, others present and source). Consistency of probed recall was assessed by a coding scheme of Neisser and Harsch (1992) and their Weighted Attribute Score (WAS) to enable comparisons with a large number of previous studies (e.g., M.A. Conway et al., 1994; Cohen et al., 1994; Curci & Luminet, 2006; Davidson & Glisky, 2002; Hornstein, Brown , & Mulligan, 2003; Shapiro, 2006; Schmolk et al., 2000; Smith et al., 2003; Tekcan et al., 2003) .
Hypotheses
If flashbulb memories are different from ordinary autobiographical memories, then the retention of memories of the control event after a shorter delay of 11-12 months would still be worse than those of flashbulb memories after a longer delay of 23-24 months. In addition, according to Mather"s (2004) emotional compensation hypothesis "age differences in forgetting and distortion should be greater for the
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control events than for the shocking events" (p. 289). Therefore, it was predicted that age effects, for both phenomenological aspects and test-retest consistency, would be obtained for the control event in Study 2, but not for the flashbulb event in Study 1.
Method

Overall design
The design was between subjects with four independent factors: (1) age of participants (young, old); (2) the type of event (flashbulb, control); (3) delay between the event and initial testing (short, long), and (4) number of initial tests (one, two).
Thus, half of the participants were tested only once and half were tested again after two weeks from their initial test. All participants were contacted again for a final re-test after a delay of two years (flashbulb event) or of one year (control event). Since none of the ANOVAs reported in this paper resulted in main effects of delay between the event and initial testing and number of initial tests (for details, see Kvavilashvili, Mirani, Schlagman, Foley & Kornbrot, in press), or any interactions involving these factors (for an exception see Footnote 8) , the results will be reported only for the variables of age (young, old) and type of event (flashbulb, control).
There were three sets of dependent variables (see Table 1 ): (1) self-rated background measures of encoding and rehearsal (surprise, emotion, rehearsal, confidence, etc.); (2) phenomenological characteristics of memories irrespective of their consistency (the number of canonical items mentioned in free recall, specificity of the response to the 5 canonical items in probed recall and vividness on a 10-point scale); and (3) memory consistency score (WAS) derived from participants" answers to the five canonical questions in probed recall at test and re-test.
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Materials
The interview protocols for initial tests and a final re-test are shown in Table 1 .
The free recall and probed recall items were identical to those in the FMQ of M.A. Conway et al. (1994; see also Neisser & Harsch, 1992) . Background ratings of emotion, stress and surprise relevant to encoding were obtained on a 10-point scale on all test occasions. Further measures relevant to post encoding, comprising confidence for probed and free recall and rehearsal items (also on a 10-point scale) were obtained at final re-test. 3 The FMQ used in Study 2 was identical to that in Study 1 except differences in the wording that described the reception event. In addition, the question about national importance was dropped as obviously irrelevant.
Cognitive functioning of participants
Participants were screened for cognitive functioning using three tests. Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) , and has 94% sensitivity and 100% specificity in discriminating patients with Alzheimer"s disease from normal controls (Brandt, Spencer, & Folstein, 1988) . The second was the Isaacs Set Test (IST) of verbal (category) fluency with a maximum score of 40 (Isaacs & Kennie, 1973) . The third was a short version of Wechsler Similarities Test (WST) (Wechsler, 1981) , which requires participants to explain similarities between word pairs (e.g., orange-banana) (with maximum score of 10). 4 As a result of this screening, the data of four old participants in Study 1 and two old participants in Study 2 were excluded. Furthermore, none of the participants reported any hearing problems, experience of serious head injury, stroke, mental health and/or memory problems diagnosed by a physician. All participants had English as a first language.
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The characteristics of participants retained in the final sample are presented in They were invited to take part in a study examining people's memories of how they first heard the news of a major public event such as the terrorist attack in New York. It was explained that participation was voluntary and that a few more interviews could follow in subsequent years. After obtaining oral consent, the Flashbulb Memory Questionnaire was administered over the telephone (see Table 1 ). Participants were asked to talk slowly and clearly into the phone, which ensured answers could be recorded verbatim by the researcher. Each interview lasted between 10 and 20 minutes.
Half of the participants were re-tested after 2 weeks from this initial interview. They were asked to recall the reception event as they remembered it on that day rather than trying to remember the answers they gave in the previous interview. Procedure. The study was advertised as a project on memory and aging, which required participants to take part in several telephone interviews on their memories of personally experienced events. During an initial screening interview, conducted by one of the three interviewers (two females and one male), participants were informed that in order to take part, they had to own and be familiar with using a mobile phone as they would be contacted via their mobile on one or two occasions. They were also informed that they had a good chance to win £100 (about $160) within their age group in a prize draw that would be shortly run by the research team. To make this prize draw more salient, participants were asked if they were happy for their name to be disclosed to other participants if they won the draw. This was followed by the three tests assessing their cognitive status (TICS, IST, WST). At the end of the interview participants were informed that the second interview would be conducted fairly soon (e.g., early next week), and were asked to keep their mobiles switched on. They were not informed of the exact day and time of this call.
Effects of Age on Flashbulb and Non-Flashbulb Memories 13
The following week participants were contacted on their mobile by another researcher who informed them that the interview they were expecting had to be cancelled, and that the researcher who conducted the initial interview would get in touch again soon. Finally, participants were told that the prize draw had taken place and that unfortunately they did not win the prize. It was not possible to reveal the names of the two winners as they wished to remain anonymous.
5
As in Study 1, half of the participants were contacted after a short delay (1-2 days) from receiving the news about the prize draw and half after a longer delay of 10 and 11 days. Within each group, half of the participants were re-tested after two weeks from their initial test. During these interviews the FMQ was used, but participants were asked to recall their personal circumstances in which they first heard the news that they did not win the prize. All participants were finally re-tested for their memories of the control event in Coding the phenomenological characteristics of memories Quantity of details in free recall. The quantity of information provided in memory descriptions was assessed in terms of whether participants mentioned any of the following categories, out of a possible 10: time, location, activity, others present, source of the news, own emotion, others emotion, any preceding events, aftermath and any irrelevant/additional detail (cf. Warren & Starwood, 1992) . A score of "1" was assigned if a particular category was mentioned (for example, "in the morning", "at 2:00 p.m." in case of time), and a score of "0" if it was not mentioned. Participants were only awarded a point for a category if it was explicitly mentioned in the memory description, even if they later recalled it as part of a probed recall. The scores could range from "0" (i.e., no memory of the reception event) to a maximum of "10".
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Specificity of answers in probed recall. Following Kvavilashvili et al. (2003) and Tekcan and Peynircioglu (2002) , we used a 3-point scoring system (from "0" to "2") to code the specificity of participants" answers to canonical questions about time, location, activity, source and others present. A score of '2' was assigned when the response contained specific information, for example, a particular radio station (Capital FM) in response to a question about the source. A score of '1' was assigned to a general, vague response, e.g., "at home" in response to the location question. A more specific response (e.g., in my bedroom) was required to get 2 points. "Cannot remember" or responses preceded by "maybe" and "probably", were scored as '0'.
Hence, the maximum possible score for probed recall specificity was 10.
Coding of test-retest consistency of probed recall (WAS)
Following Neisser and Harsch (1992) , participants" answers to each of the five probe questions at a re-test were assigned a score of "0", "1", or "2" depending on how consistent they were with the answers provided at the initial test. A score of '0' was given if participants could not remember or if they recalled information that was completely different from the initial test (e.g., 'my father' instead of 'my friend'). A score of '1' was assigned if participants provided either less specific information ('my friend' instead of 'my friend Jon') or slightly incorrect information (e.g., 'my friend Sam' instead of 'my friend Jon'). A score of '2' was assigned if participants provided either the same information at both tests (e.g., 'my friend') or the same information plus additional detail at the re-test (initially 'my friend' and then 'my friend Jon').
7
The total consistency score, derived from this coding scheme varies from 0 to 10. However, according to Neisser and Harsch (1992) , location, activity and source are the core canonical categories (if one remembers all three one has got a basic story of hearing the news), whereas time and others present are the less important attributes of
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flashbulb memories (see Tekcan et al., 2003 for providing direct empirical support for this idea). The Weighted Attribute Score (WAS) reflects this by assigning a maximum score of "2" for place, activity and source, and giving one bonus point if a participant"s cumulative score for time and others present is 3 or more (out of a total possible 4).
The WAS ranges from 0 to 7, with higher scores reflecting better consistency.
Although identical results were obtained for total consistency (0 to 10) and WAS (0 to 7), only the latter is reported here.
All coding of memory consistency and phenomenological qualities was carried out by several pairs of independent coders; the percentage of agreement varied from 85% to 100%, and discrepancies were solved by discussion.
Results Table 3 shows the mean ratings of background variables for young and old The data for each variable were entered separately into 2 event (flashbulb, control) x 2 age (young, old) between subject ANOVAs. All analyses resulted in a significant main effect of event with the flashbulb event being consistently rated as more surprising/emotional/important, etc. than the control event. The effect sizes of event ranged from medium (  =.12) for the ratings of confidence in the free recall at final re- Table 4 shows the means for the three phenomenological variables (quantity of recalled information, specificity of participants" answers to five questions and vividness for the memory of the reception context) which were entered separately into a 2 age (young, old) x 2 event (flashbulb, control) x 2 time of testing (initial test, final re-test) mixed ANOVAs with the repeated measures on the last factor.
Background variables
Phenomenological characteristics of memories
Quantity of recalled information. The analysis on the number of canonical categories mentioned in free recall resulted in main effects of both event and time of testing, which were qualified by a significant event by time of testing interaction, In summary, there were no age effects on the phenomenological characteristics of flashbulb memories. All three remained stable over a two-year delay. By contrast, there was a reliable drop in phenomenological characteristics of the control event. In addition, older adults" control memories were less specific and contained fewer canonical categories than younger adults" memories.
Test-retest consistency of memories
To assess the consistency of probed recall, the mean WAS were calculated for flashbulb and control events using the scoring system described in the method section.
These means were entered into a 2 age (young, old) x 2 event (flashbulb, control)
between subjects ANOVA (see Table 5 ). There was a significant main effect of event, (all Fs<2.61) . In young participants it was also negative (r = -.24) but fell just short of significance (p=.059). This means that those who reported rehearsing their personal circumstances of hearing the news of September 11 were actually less consistent after a delay of two years than those participants who thought about it less frequently (see Bohannon & Symons, 1992 , who also obtained negative correlations in participants who reported being emotionally affected by the news).
Correlation analyses
Discussion
Effects of age on flashbulb and control memories
Despite a growing number of studies on flashbulb memories in young adults (mainly undergraduate students), there are less than a dozen published studies on the effects of age on flashbulb memories (see introduction). While some have examined only the phenomenological characteristics of memories, others have mainly focused on test-retest consistency with delay intervals of 6 to 12 months. 9 The present aging study, to our knowledge, is the first to use a delay as long as 23-24 months and obtain both phenomenological and consistency measures for both young and old adults.
Another key feature of this study is the comparison of age effects on flashbulb memories and those of a staged control event that was the same for all participants. In a previous aging study with a comparison control event, Davidson et al. (2006) used an unspecified (personal) event of participants" own choice in the week before the
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flashbulb event (September 11). They obtained a significant age affect in the consistency of memories for the control event but no age effect for September 11. In line with this finding, and the emotional compensation hypothesis of Mather (2004), it was predicted that significant age effects would be obtained only for memories of the control event but not for the flashbulb event.
Results concerning the flashbulb memories were in line with these predictions.
Thus, older adults" flashbulb memories were as vivid, detailed and specific after a delay of two years as those of young adults. In addition, their answers to canonical questions were not less consistent over time than those of young adults. This absence of age effects in the phenomenology and consistency of flashbulb memories was not due to older adults being more affected by the attack, as there were no reliable age differences in any of the background variables (see Table 3 ). Also, the consistency scores were by no means at ceiling, which might have masked the presence of age effects (Uttl, 2005) . Most importantly, the absence of age effects was not due to having 16 (25%) middle-aged adults (in their 40s and 50s) in the sample of young participants in Study 1. Indeed, a separate regression analysis on the flashbulb memory consistency scores with chronological age as a predictor did not result in a significant effect of age (2009) that re-tested a large national random sample (N=319) after delays of both one
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year and two years from September 11. Taken together, these results suggest that if a flashbulb event is of sufficient magnitude and importance (as September 11 clearly was) then there will be no age effects in the phenomenology and the consistency of flashbulb memories over long delays of at least two years. In fact, all our participants were re-tested one more time in summer 2004, almost 3 years from September 11, and still no age effects emerged either for phenomenological characteristics or test-retest consistency (see Kvavilashvili et al., in press ).
By contrast, findings for the control memories were only partially in line with the emotional compensation hypothesis. Thus, as predicted, significant age effects were obtained for all phenomenological characteristics of memories except vividness.
In particular, older adults provided fewer canonical categories in their free recall and were less specific in their answers to five probe questions than young adults.
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However, no effects of age emerged for the consistency of probed recall -older adults" control memories (albeit less detailed and specific) were nevertheless as consistent after a delay of one year as those of young adults. This finding was unexpected.
Indeed, laboratory studies of source memory would predict significant age effects in the recall of the context of hearing the news of fairly unimportant and non-emotional news (see Spencer & Raz, 1995) . The absence of age effects for the consistency of the control event also contradicts earlier findings of Davidson et al. (2006) who showed significant age effects in the consistency of recall of participants" self-nominated event from the week preceding the flashbulb event. One possible explanation for the absence of age effect in the consistency of control memories is that older adults" control memories were of poorer quality (i.e., less specific and fewer details), so it was easier for them to maintain the consistency between poor reports than for younger adults whose reports were more detailed and specific.
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Laboratory research on episodic memory has also shown that age effects can be eliminated when older adults have to focus on emotional or socially relevant information about the source (e.g., whether it is truthful or not, good or bad) (see May, Rahhal, Berry & Leighton, 2005; Rahhal, May & Hasher, 2002) or when they consider information as relevant either to them (i.e., self reference effect, see Gutchess, Kensinger, Yoon, & Schacter, 2007) or to their everyday knowledge (e.g., Castel, 2005) . It is, therefore, possible that hearing the news of not winning the prize was perceived as a self-relevant and somewhat distinctive (albeit unimportant) event, which eliminated age effects. Clearly, more research needs to be conducted on laboratory source memory tasks with self or social relevance and memories of staged control events outside the laboratory. It is particularly important to compare both types of tasks in one sample of young and old adults to examine the extent to which the findings from laboratory tasks of episodic source memory can be generalized to memories of personal autobiographical events (cf. Davidson et al., 2006) .
Are flashbulb memories different from control non-flashbulb memories?
For both age groups, the consistency was significantly better for September 11 than for the control event, even though the flashbulb test-retest interval was almost twice as long than that for the control event. Moreover, this superior consistency was present even after only two weeks from the initial test as shown by the results of those participants who were tested twice shortly after the event (see Figure 1 ). In addition, the drop in consistency over a 1-year period was much more dramatic for control memories (  =.54) than for flashbulb memories over a 2-year period (  =.26). All these findings support the idea that flashbulb memories are indeed different from ordinary non-flashbulb memories.
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Further evidence that flashbulb and control memories are qualitatively different comes from the comparison of their phenomenological aspects and the results of correlational analyses. Thus, irrespective of their consistency, flashbulb memories contained more details and were more specific than control memories both at the time of initial and final re-tests. Perhaps, the most important finding in this respect refers to the ratings of vividness (see Table 4 ). For flashbulb memories these were very high at the initial test and did not reliably decrease after a delay of 2 years (for similar findings see Kvavilashvili et al., 2003; Talarico & Rubin, 2003; Weaver & Krug, 2004) .
For control memories, the ratings were reliably lower than in flashbulbs at initial test and substantially decreased after a delay of only 1 year.
Furthermore, an intriguing and discrepant pattern of correlations emerged in flashbulb and control memories for self-rated rehearsal (remembering and/or thinking of the reception context). While rehearsal was positively correlated with consistency scores in control memories, an opposite trend was present in flashbulb memories -the higher the self-rated rehearsal of personal circumstances, the lower the test-retest consistency scores. A possible explanation for this negative correlation is that public events, such as September 11, are constantly televised and discussed so that each person would hear the news several times from different sources (Neisser & Harsch, 1992) . It is possible that over time, people will remember or rehearse several different occasions of hearing the news on that day, and this may negatively affect their consistency scores for the first reception context. This cannot, by definition, happen with the personal control event, hence the positive correlations obtained in Study 2.
The superior consistency of flashbulb memories, compared with control memories, replicates previous findings of Davidson et al. (2006) , Christianson (1989) and Curci and Luminet (2006) were asked to provide key words which would act as reminders when recalling the same event in the future. It is, therefore, possible that participants deliberately committed this event to memory for future retrieval, and they were quite successful in doing so (see also Weaver, 1993) . By contrast, participants in Davidson et al. (2006) often could not remember what the personal event was that they described at the initial testing. Even when given explicit reminders (e.g., "a party" or "a movie"), their recall was poor and reliably worse than for flashbulb memories. There is no doubt that people can remember certain events accurately if they deliberately decide to. However, flashbulb memories as well as most everyday autobiographical memories are encoded incidentally, without any deliberate intention to remember anything. Therefore, comparing flashbulb memories with deliberately encoded personal episodes may not be an appropriate comparison (for a discussion of this point, see Pillemer, 2009 ).
Theoretical implications for cognitive aging research
Our results showed no age effects in the consistency of either flashbulb or control memories. The absence of age effects cannot be attributed to insufficient power or ceiling effects in the WAS. The importance of this finding for cognitive aging research is emphasized by the reliable age effects, obtained in both studies, in a standard laboratory test of immediate free recall of ten words (see Table 2 ). Table 2 also shows that older adults had fewer years of education than young adults and scored lower on all other cognitive tasks in Study 1 and on category fluency task (IST) in
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Study 2. In other words, we did not have unusually well-functioning older adults who would not display any age effects in other cognitive tasks including a simple episodic memory task.
For flashbulb memories, the findings were predicted from Mather"s (2004) emotional compensation hypothesis and are generally consistent with recent aging research on emotional memory showing reduced or no age effects for emotionally arousing material (for a review see Kensinger, 2009 ). Although the absence of age effects in the consistency of a staged control event was unexpected, this finding is in line with some laboratory studies of episodic memory that have also failed to obtain age effects with self-relevant or naturalistic materials (Castel, 2005; Gutchess et al., 2007) . Overall, however, older adults" autobiographical memories (whether flashbulb or ordinary) appear to be much better retained and more consistent than one would predict from numerous laboratory studies of explicit episodic memory including source memory tasks (Grady & Craik, 2000; Light, 1991; Zacks, Hasher, & Li, 2000) .
In this respect, interesting parallels can be drawn with developmental research on children"s memory in and outside of the laboratory. For example, Warren and Starwood (1992) failed to obtain age effects in the test-retest consistency of 5-to 13-year old children"s flashbulb memories of Challenger explosion over a delay of 2 years. A recent series of test-retest studies of children"s autobiographical memories of traumatic events (an injury and treatment in emergency room), conducted by Peterson and her colleagues, also showed few differences between 5-and 13-year old children in the consistency of their recall over delays of 6 months to 5 years (see Peterson, 2002 , for a review). The absence of age effects in these studies is in stark contrast to very large effects between the ages of 5 and 13 documented in numerous laboratory
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studies with a variety of explicit episodic memory tasks (see Kurtz-Costes, Schneider, & Rupp, 1995; also Gathercole, 1998 for a review).
Following Rendell and Craik (2000) , this contrasting pattern of results in and outside the laboratory can be termed the "real-life/laboratory paradox". In the research of these authors on prospective memory (e.g., remembering to do things in the future), young adults performed better on typical laboratory tasks -a consistent finding in research on prospective memory and aging (see Henry, MacLeod, Phillips, & Crawford, 2004) . In contrast, older adults outperformed young participants in everyday prospective memory tasks and this advantage was not due to differences in using external aids or rehearsal strategies (see also Rendell & Thompson, 1999) . In terms of their emotional significance the everyday prospective memory tasks were probably similar to memories of a staged control event used in the present study. The reasons behind the "real-life/laboratory paradox" are not entirely clear (see McDaniel, Einstein, & Rendell, 2008) . It is possible that studying age effects in flashbulb and staged control events will shed some light on mechanisms underlying this intriguing paradox.
Theoretical implications for flashbulb memory research
Results of our study appear to contradict the currently popular theory, held by
Neisser and several other researchers, that flashbulb memories are prone to distortions and forgetting like ordinary, non-flashbulb memories (Neisser, 1982; Neisser & Harsch, 1992; McCloskey, 1992; Smith et al., 2003; Talarico & Rubin, 2003; Winograd, 1992; Wright, 1993) . According to this view, the encoding of flashbulb memories is mediated by the operation of the same variables that are responsible for preferential encoding of ordinary memories (e.g., novelty, distinctiveness). In addition, the long-term retention of these memories is primarily due to high levels of rehearsal
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of the event and of one"s personal circumstances that inevitably take place in the delay period through extensive media coverage and social sharing of the news.
However, the superior consistency of flashbulb memories obtained in the present study cannot be explained by increased rehearsal. Indeed, the rates of rehearsal (thinking about personal circumstances) were fairly low for both flashbulb and control memories on a 10-point scale (M=3.05 and M=1.21, respectively). In addition, while rehearsal correlated positively with the consistency scores of control memories, this correlation was negative for flashbulb memories (see Table 6 ). Further evidence in support of the idea that retention is not mediated by rehearsal comes from the finding that there was no effect of number of initial tests on final consistency scores. Those who were tested twice in September 2001 were no more consistent than those who were tested only once (see design in method section; for similar results see Hirst et al., 2009; Hornstein et al., 2003; Shapiro, 2006; Tizzard-Drover & Peterson, 2004; Warren & Starwood, 1992) . Together, these results suggest that the long-term retention and consistency of flashbulb memories are mediated by processes that occur at encoding (cf. Kvavilashvili et al., in press) . It is, however, unclear whether these involve primarily novelty/distinctiveness (Neisser, 1982) or emotional arousal/consequentiality (Brown and Kulik, 1977) . Normally, the novelty and arousal co-occur in any dramatic flashbulb event so it is possible that the superior encoding of flashbulb memories is a product of both types of processes.
Conclusions and future directions
Research on aging and autobiographical memory has been based primarily on a method in which participants recall their memories in response to word cues or time periods suggested by a researcher. Like laboratory studies of episodic memory, this research has resulted in significant age effects both in terms of the specificity of
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recalled memories and their retrieval times (Piolino, et al., 2006; Rubin & Schulkind, 1997; Schlagman et al., 2009) How surprised were you to hear this news? Please answer on a rating scale where 1 is "Not surprised at all" and 10 is "Extremely surprised".
Surprise Encoding
How stressed did you feel later on in the day after you heard the news? Please answer on a rating scale where 1 is "Not stresses at all" and 10 is "Extremely stressed".
Stress Encoding
Background 3 How often have you been thinking about Flashbulb: the terrorists' attack in New York on 11 September? Control: not winning a prize? Please answer on a rating scale where 1 is "Not at all" and 10 is "all the time".
Rehearsal Post-encoding
How vivid is your memory of circumstances in which you first heard the news? Please provide an answer on a rating scale on which 1 is "no image at all" and 10 is "extremely vivid image, almost like normal vision". Please answer on a rating scale where 1 is "Never" and 10 is "Very often, at least once a day".
Vividness Phenomenology
Rehearsal of Event
Post encoding Background 6 How often have you been remembering or thinking of your personal circumstances in which you heard the news of Flashbulb: the terrorist attack in the past two years? Control: not winning the prize in the past year? Please answer on a rating scale where 1 is "Never" and 10 is "Very often, at least once a day". (Brandt, et al., 1988) ; ISTIsaacs Set Test (Isaacs & Kenny, 1973) ; WST -Wechsler Similarities Test (Wechsler, 1981) . Note. * P <.05, ** P <.01, *** P <.001
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